Views on Humanitarian Intervention:

It was admitted as an effective remedy during civil wars and similar upheavals by Kofi Annan in 1999[3] but met disapproval by other members of the Organization.

According to Alton Frye (Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine), there are three main principles which humanitarian intervention hinges upon: use of military forces, interference with state’s internal affairs, and motivation by humanitarian objectives. As we can see, first two points do not bring any peaceful connotation, but on the contrary resemble standard military intervention.

Two most well-known examples of failure to bring in essential measures are operations in Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s. These lapses urged the UN Aid to introduce new measures in the early 2000s which required a switch from Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect.

Three former principles were replaced with the following:

• protection from mass human rights violations;

• asking for international community assistance in the case of incapability of providing;

• resorting to military action only as a last option.[4]

It proves that the intervention was claimed to be no longer effective. The resolution had directed the UN Aid in the peaceful and diplomatic path and upgraded their policies to the next level. Along with that came the realization of necessity of better trained and equipped forces in case of intervention since militants proved to be inefficient both in Rwanda and Somalia.

Another hitch, according to Humanitarian Policy Group Report, is dwindling numbers in funding. In 2001, instead of requested $2.74bn the UN Aid received only $974m – the gap is striking, whereas the activity of the organization is fully dependent on financial donors. That, of course, affected the recipients of humanitarian aid throughout the world, as the assistance promised did not trickle down to them.